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Science as Representation: Flouting the Criteria    
Bas van Fraassen (Princeton University) 
 
Abstract.  Science represents the phenomena, and it does so by providing representations 
of nature with the phenomena at best as a part. Criteria of adequacy for a representation 
pertain to accuracy and truth; but that representation is selective and may require 
distortion even in the selected parameters is an old and familiar point, intimately related 
to the insight that representation is intentional with adequacy relative to its particular 
purpose. If we add to this that observation and measurement are perspectival and that the 
appearances to be saved are the perspectival measurement outcomes, the question 
whether this "saving" is an explanatory relation in contemporary physics can provide a 
new focus for the realist/anti-realist debate.  The Born rule and von Neumann's "collapse" 
postulate in quantum mechanics provide a telling case. 
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Science is a representation of nature, in mathematical form, accomplishing by this means 
...  a certain end, that philosophers debate. Criteria of success or completeness for 
scientific representation must be related to this end, but appear concretely in science itself 
in theory choice and evaluation.  Remarkably, scientific progress at times involves 
precisely the rejection of previously proclaimed criteria.  But the aftermath of such a 
rejection is quite typically a reactionary philosophical effort at restoration. 
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1. Three completeness criteria 
 The Aristotelian ideal that science must explain how things happen by 
demonstrating that they must happen in the way they do was rejected in the time of 
Galileo, Gassendi, Boyle, Descartes, and Newton.  But the reaction sets in with their own 
and other writings of the period as they focus on the idea of laws of nature -- and both 
Leibniz and Descartes even suggest an a priori foundation for these laws. 
 Modern science recognized determinism as a new criterion:  a scientific account 
of a phenomenon is not complete until it represents this phenomenon as part of a 
deterministic process.  Supporting this criterion, or perhaps deriving from its force, was 
the philosophical creed that the very intelligibility of nature and the very coherence of 
experience require their possibility of being conceivable as set in a rigidly deterministic 
causal order.  
 This criterion was vocally rejected by the quantum physicists, and the success of 
the new quantum theory was attributed in part to its resolute acceptance of an irreducible 
indeterminism in nature.  With one criterion gone, another must be put in place, and 
Reichenbach offered  an apparently weaker but still substantive new completeness 
criterion: the Common Cause Principle1.  This principle is satisfied by the causal models 
of general use in social sciences and for many purposes in the natural sciences as well.  
But the violation of Bell’s inequalities shows that even this third criterion was rejected, in 
effect, by the new physics.  Here too, as we well know, there has been a good deal of 
reactionary efforts at restoration, the most successful being Bohm’s mechanics -- which 
surprisingly presents a picture of 'determinism without causality' so to speak.   
 
2.  Appearance and reality 
 There was  a fourth completeness criterion much more deeply ingrained in 
modern physics; but that too was one clearly, emphatically, and explicitly rejected in the 
Copenhagen School.   Physics in the modern era depicts reality as quite different from the 
                                                 
1 Cf. my "Rational belief and the common cause principle", and references therein.  
(Bibliographical data for my own papers can be found on http://web.princeton.edu/vanfraas/.)  
Under certain conditions this criterion actually demands determinism, as I show there.  But from 
the example of Bohmian mechanics, we can also see that satisfaction of this criterion is not 
logically implied by determinism; see further notes below. 
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appearances, but accepts the criterion that a complete physics must explain how those 
appearances are produced in reality.  The disparity is salient when Galileo and Gassendi 
embrace atomism:  those atoms have only primary properties while the appearances are 
colorful, noisy, smelly, and tasty.   Descartes, though not an atomist, goes further by 
restricting the real attributes of matter to extension in space and time.  Newton's forces 
and masses certainly don't diminish this disparity, nor do the classical fields whether 
adding to or replacing matter in this representation of the real physical world. 
What does "explain" mean in this context?  Each of the three criteria I gave as 
examples before this one involved modality (whether physical, metaphysical, or logical 
necessity).  So does the fourth, which I'll call the Appearance from Reality Criterion, for 
it is a demand for explanation, satisfiable only by connections deeper than brute or 
factual regularity.   We credit modern science with adequate and satisfactory explanations 
of how many familiar phenomena are produced: how ash is produced when we burn a 
cigarette or some logs, how methane is naturally produced in a swamp, and how a flame 
is turned yellow when a sodium sample is inserted.  These effects are not simply 
predicted to occur under suitable conditions: we are shown how they are produced in 
nature.  The last example is already one in which an aspect of appearance (color) is 
explained, and this explanation is continued from optics  to the physiology of vision.  In 
this way the scientific representation of nature is shown to include the appearances in 
question not just as fitting into that representation (that would be a minimal requirement 
-- the one Bellarmini suggested to Galileo as solely relevant), but as produced as proper 
part of the reality depicted. 
Before turning to the rejection of this criterion in the 20th century I want to 
explain the form its satisfaction took in modern physics, for the most basic attributes of 
the appearances, namely their spatial and temporal form.  Recent philosophy of mind 
contains arguments against the physicalist reducibility of such properties as color, but 
however that may be2, the rejection I am talking about goes much deeper.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Cf. Ronald Giere (ms. 2000) for a philosophy of science approach to this subject. 
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3.  Phenomena vs. visual appearances 
 There were two developments in techniques of representation before Galileo that 
we can see as feeding into the kinematic representation developed in his century.  The 
first was that of linear one-point perspective in painting, and the second Copernicus' and 
Tycho's mastery of transforming geometric models in astronomy so as to shift the center 
taken as 'at rest'.  Both concentrated on how  a description of the visual appearance from 
particular vantage points can be derived from a reality admitting of many different 
vantage points.  Both grew from the subject of Perspectiva, a melange of geometry, 
optics, and practical drafting techniques, and both were steps on the way to projective and 
descriptive geometry.  But the sorts of representation they provided were more than 
superficially different. 
Linear perspective in painting began with Giotto in the 14th century.  Theory was 
not far behind:  early in the 15th century Brunelleschi’s “experiment” demonstrated the 
perspectival technique, and Vasari’s monograph proclaimed that the new art of "painting 
is nothing more than the simple portrayal of all things alive in nature by means of design 
and color as nature herself produces them."3  But that this was in effect a method of 
measurement, with the drawing as measurement outcome, was clearly recognized upon 
more mathematically oriented reflection.  Its techniques derived from the geometry of 
Euclid’s Optics, gave birth to the early stages of projective geometry (Pascal, Desarques), 
and was at least theoretically mechanized in Duerer’s revealingly titled Art of 
Measurement.  
The content of such a visual perspective is precisely the content of a complex, 
technically advanced measurement outcome.   For every triple consisting of a point in 
space,  an orientation, and a plane cutting that orientation,  there is a one-point linear 
perspective projecting the world onto that plane.  We should recognize this as a crucial 
general observation concerning all measurement:  measurement is perspectival.  The 
content of any measurement outcome, whether a proposition or a diagram, is indexical, it 
is not how things are but how they look "from here".     
                                                 
3 cited Gombrich, Art and Illusion (1960), p.12 
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 Representations of the solar system by Copernicus, and Tycho were such that 
each could refer to the other as showing the way things look from a  different vantage 
point.  Yet we must be clear that they were not constructing content of visual perspectives 
in the way of the [Vasari] painter.  The latter constructs as it were the outcome of a single 
measurement.  The astronomical models are three-dimensional, and what is shown in 
them is what the content must be from any chosen vantage point.  It would indeed be 
natural for Copernicus to say that Tycho's or Ptolemy's model just shows the content of 
the earth-bound perspective.  Natural, but inaccurate:  in the same way that it is natural 
but inaccurate to speak of frames of reference in the modern physics about to develop as 
perspectival.  The kinematic quantities do vary from frame to frame, but unlike the 
content of a visual perspective, the content of a frame does not suffer from occlusion and 
marginal distortion.4 
 Copernicus' model represents the observable phenomena, that is, certain processes 
in space and time.  What the Copernican does in order to credential his representation is 
to explain by means of geometric optics and projective geometry how the visual 
appearances (content of outcomes of measurements made by astronomers) are produced 
from his reality.  When frames of reference come into their own, we have eventually a 
three-level representation:  there is the world as described in co-ordinate independent 
terms, then the world as described in a given frame of reference (co-ordinatization), and 
finally the world as it looks from  a given vantage point with specific orientation.  The 
first admits of many of the second sort, and the second of many of the third sort.  In the 
modern era, each level has a certain completeness, in that the higher level is uniquely 
determined by the collection of those at the next level plus the transformations that 
connect them -- but also a representation on the first or second level 'contains everything' 
in a way that the third most definitely cannot.5   With Special Relativity, all this can still 
be said; with General Relativity we must already admit that a single frame of reference, 
like a 2-dimensional map of any part of the Earth, cannot 'contain everything' in that 
                                                 
4 Such limiting features may be crucial to the distinction between visual picturing and other 
modes of representation; see Ch. 6 of Dominick Lopes, Understanding Pictures, Oxford1996.   
5 We may reasonably suspect that the conviction that this is so helped to inspire the 
"construction" programs of Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World and Carnap's Aufbau. 
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sense.  But there is no diminishing there of the rightful claim that both the phenomena 
and the kinematic appearances from any given vantage point in space and time can be 
shown to be produced within the depicted reality. 
 
 
5.  The Strange Case of Quantum Mechanics 
The vehicle for prediction in quantum mechanics is, at heart, the Born Rule: If 
observable A is measured on a system in quantum state ψ, the expectation value of the 
outcome is < ψ, A ψ>.  Measurement outcomes are the appearances; the quantum states 
are the theoretically described reality.  For the Born rule to yield checkable predictions of 
the appearances to us we must be willing to lay down at least as hypotheses that a given 
recognizable object has a certain quantum state and that a certain recognizable process is 
an A-measurement.  The famous measurement problem is that our two descriptions, one 
of what happens at the level we can observe and one of the processes as modeled in 
quantum mechanics, do not match.   
As far as prediction goes, the riches gained have been beyond the dreams of 
avarice…. but no explanation of how the observed phenomena derive from the quantum 
state via the character of object and measurement set-up was forthcoming.  This 'gap' in 
our understanding of nature (as it was indeed described) has engendered a plethora of 
attempted re-interpretations of the quantum theory, in opposition to the Copenhagen 
creed that there really is no gap to be filled. 
How much does the Born rule say?  If different measurement outcomes are 
compatible with the simultaneous quantum state of the whole set-up (object plus 
apparatus plus any part of the environment from which that is not isolated) then the 
measurement outcomes do not supervene on the theoretically described reality.  But that 
"if" does not follow from what I have said so far. The Born rule starts with the initial 
quantum state of the object; it does not rule out that the measurement outcome 
supervenes or even derives from the final state of  the object, or of  the object+apparatus.  
But is that so?  Can it be so? 
  Heisenberg was the most straightforward advocate for the view that the Born rule 
is enough and completes the task of physics.  In contrast, von Neumann and Wigner 
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provided the most salient example of  wishing to add to the theory so as to satisfy the 
Appearance from Reality criterion (see below)6.  Since then it seems to me that the 
currently more or less acceptable interpretations offered fall into three classes:  (i) the sort 
that purport to derive the Appearance from the Reality but fail, and (ii)those that do not 
purport to do this, but either (ii-1) pay lip service to the old ideal or (ii-2) more honestly 
content themselves to flesh out the Born interpretation in a way that precludes this third 
sort of completeness altogether.7  If that is correct, of course, then the Copenhagen school 
was right to reject the Appearance from Reality Criterion as imperative for the sciences.  
Is there a 'collapse'? 
  Von Neumann's Projection Postulate implies that in a measurement, the quantum 
state of the object is projected or ‘collapsed’ into one of the eigenstates of the measured 
quantity.  The immediate questions are: What constitutes a measurement? and What 
explains this collapse?   The two sorts of responses which attempt to maintain Von 
Neumann’s proposal were initially typified by Wigner on the one hand, and by 
Groenewold and Margenau on the other.   
  Wigner answered that a measurement is not an event completely describable in 
physics, it must include consciousness, a mind-body interaction.8  This only looks like it 
answers the second question, for in fact it provides no clue at all to how the Appearances 
thus derive from the Reality.   
 Groenewold and Margenau argued instead that von Neumann’s added postulate was 
                                                 
6 There have of course been others, such as Prugovecki's non-linear corrections to the 
Schroedinger equation and the GRW indeterministic 'swerve', a random partial collapse with 
measurable frequency. 
7 I will actually only look at some sorts of interpretations, and realize that both the range I inspect 
and my assessment of what are currently more or less acceptable interpretations, are 
controvertible.  With respect to the Bohmian option I'll again avoid a direct confrontation, but I 
place it in the first class. 
8 Imagine Schroedinger's dismay -- he wrote " For it must have given to de Broglie the same 
shock and disappointment as it gave to me, when we learnt that a sort of transcendental, almost 
psychical interpretation of the wave phenomenon had been put forward, which was very soon 
hailed by the majority of leading theorists as the only one reconcilable with experiments, and 
which has now become the orthodox creed, accepted by almost everybody, with a few notable 
exceptions." [Erwin Schroedinger, "The meaning of wave mechanics", pp. 16-30 in Louis de 
Broglie physicien et penseur, edited by Andre George, Editions Albin Michel, Paris, 1953; page 
16. 
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purely interpretative and did not really augment the Born Rule.  We can illustrate their 
argument with Schroedinger’s famous Cat: the probability that at the end we will find the 
cat still alive is the same on both calculations, assuming that there is or there is not a 
collapse of the wave function at the midway time when the infernal device functions.  
The ostensibly correct conclusion is that von Neumann’s postulate does not affect the 
empirical content of the theory.  That is not correct, since there is a definable quantity 
pertaining to the system as a whole (box with Cat etc. inside) for which measurement 
outcome probabilities are certainly different on the two scenarios.9 
 Let's admit that von Neumann' s alteration of the quantum theory, with or without 
Wigner's addition, implies that the phenomena do derive from the quantum-mechanically 
described reality.  But the Appearance from Reality Criterion is nevertheless not satisfied 
because physics cannot provide the derivation.  The story here is that it is after all a 
stochastic process on the level of the quantum states themselves:  they develop 
deterministically except for abrupt 'swerves' during a class of special interactions, the 
measurements.10  Very well; but then we run up against the question "When is a 
measurement made?"  If we answer this with the quantum theory of measurement, the 
final transition ends up somewhere beyond description -- for there is no such 
discontinuous transition in an isolated system, and the set-up is certainly part of some 
isolated system.  But if we answer it with a non-quantum mechanical description of 
measurement set-ups (as Bohr suggested we must) then we also close the door to a 
derivation of the outcome from the quantum mechanical process.11   
                                                 
9 'Recombination' experiments furnish today the most psychologically compelling support for 
rejecting collapse, but in my view Albert's point is the most solid reason.  Albert's point does not 
give a reason to reject collapse theories -- there is no a priori reason to expect the predictions of 
the no-collapse theory to be vindicated, as opposed to those of a collapse theory.   His point 
serves only to reject the Groenewold-Margenau contention that the collapse adds no empirical 
import. 
10 That the problem I am raising does not simply derive from the indeterminism is clear because 
the GRW theory is not subject to the same objection.  They answer the "when" question 
acceptably by saying that the localization is random.  There is no special class of situations which 
are the occasions for that effect. 
11 This dilemma is arguably the reason that some physicists have insisted strongly that quantum 
mechanics is only a theory of measured systems This sort of view is to be contrasted with one 
congenial especially to cosmologists, and I think most discussants from the side of philosophy, to 
the effect we are to think of quantum mechanics as potentially applying as well to the universe as 
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  These early discussions are illuminating not only because they begin to chart our 
range of options, but also because they were closely related to practice.  Whatever the 
theoretical status of ‘collapse’, the way the working physicist calculates does always 
assume that the Appearances will be at least as if states thus collapse in measurement.  
Generations of students have applied the Born Rule to solve textbook problems imaging 
that quantum systems lurch from one pure state to another, simply asserting that upon 
measurement the object will be in one of the eigenstates of the measured observable, with 
given probability. The Appearances are as if von Neumann’s Projection Postulate is true. 
The appearances yoked unto a forbearing reality 
  Jeffrey Bubs Interpreting the Quantum World,  displays a large class of 
interpretations: modal interpretations in a general sense.  On all of them a physical 
quantity can have a determinate value even if the quantum state does not make it so.12  
Those definite values are encoded in a second state, the 'value state' or 'property state'.  
No collapse is needed for measurement outcomes: while in a quantum state which does 
not imply that at all, the object is as if it is an eigenstate of the pertinent observable.    
 I propose a new way to understand such interpretations. Do not take them as 
attributing a dual-aspect character to reality,  but rather as representing Reality (the 
quantum states) and Appearance (the value states) jointly but separately.  The value states 
are then to be understood as containing the contents of possible measurement outcomes, 
these contents being representable as indexical propositions (describing, in effect, how 
things look in a possible but specific measurement set-up).  See how this is at the same 
time like and different from how Copernicus accompanied his sun-centered model with a 
representation of how the planetary motions look from an earthly vantage point.  The 
difference is only that in Copernicus' case, the latter was derivable and explainable on the 
basis of the former.  
                                                                                                                                                 
a whole.  The choice between these two views is clearly and explicitly laid out by Wheeler's 
commentary (Reviews of Modern Physics 29,463-465)on Everett's original paper. 
12  (p.178) This class of interpretations include Bohm’s interpretation, Bub’s own, versions of 
Bohr, Kochen, and many others, though it does not in fact include all modal interpretations -- see 
further note below.  The Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation, which I shall discuss 
below, is not included, but shares the features I am outlining here. 
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 In the case of visual perspectives as treated in projective geometry, we also think of 
every point and orientation determining a perspective, regardless of whether there is a 
thus oriented measurement apparatus or viewer present at that point.  Think of it here in 
the same way.  The Appearances are the contents of possible as well as actual 
measurement outcomes.13   
  Thus the Appearances are saved -- but in a way that explicitly violates the 
Appearance from Reality Criterion.  The Appearances do not even supervene on the 
Reality,  for two systems in the same quantum state may have different value states. 
 
6. The structure of appearance 
 What are the Appearances like, on these interpretations?  We do see quite some 
variation there.14   Bub’s interpretation implies that the actual state of the world is 
characterized by the definiteness of a single ‘privileged’ observable.  That quantity need 
not be position.  We can think of his world as follows: it has a quantum state and, in 
addition to that there is an observable which has a definite value, just as if that 
observable was just measured on the world, with a collapse precipitated by that 
measurement.  Note well that this is a matter of Appearance only: the quantum state is 
                                                 
13 This must be read very carefully.  All those measurement outcome contents must cohere 
together in a certain way, so that they can be thought of as all perspectives on a single world in 
some specific quantum state.  In just the same way, the entire set of contents of visual 
perspectives, with origins in both possible and actual viewers, in a given room for example, must 
cohere so that they can be regarded as being "of" the same room.   In the case of the modal 
interpretations I am discussing, the delineation of what the joint value states can be of the parts of 
a compound system, given a quantum state for the whole, is directed to this point.  For an 
application to sequential measurement, see my ""Modal interpretation of repeated measurement: 
reply to Leeds and Healey" (1997). 
14 Although Bub lists it as one of the interpretations covered in his framework, I am not going to 
take up Bohmian mechanics here.  Bohm allows only one parameter to have a definite value – 
always the same one, always definite – namely position.  This world is one of particles that are 
always somewhere – and larger objects ‘made up’ of those particles, always in a precise spatial 
region. Their motions are continuous in time.  This view may have been inspired by the extreme 
operationalist idea, going back to Mach, that in the last analysis every measurement is a length 
measurement.  (Not very plausible:  could you describe even a length measurement operation 
using only predicates denoting lengths?) Or perhaps it derives even further back from Descartes’ 
dream of a world whose only objective properties are attributes of extension.  That the 
phenomena are saved in a weak sense only and that there is still an Appearance/Reality gap here 
is argued in my "Interpretation of QM: Parallels and Choices",  as well as in papers by Abe Stone 
and Katherine Bedard. 
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not collapsed.  
 My own favored interpretation, the Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation 
(CVMI), relates to these more or less as windowing does to one-point perspective.15  
"Windowing" is the artist David Hockney's term for a perspective-violating technique in 
painting, amply evident both in the Renaissance and in the modern era well before 
Cezanne's more drastic departures.  There is in such paintings no single privileged 
vantage point but a number of them, to which the eye (or the imagination) adjusts 
smoothly as it moves around the scene.  Similarly in the Copenhagen Variant of the 
Modal Interpretation there is no simple privileged observable.  But it is as if the 
Ignorance Interpretation of  Mixtures is correct, for every object in the world has a 
‘value state’ that is pure.  These value states are related to the quantum states and to 
measurement processes (quantum mechanically defined) so that in consequence it is also 
as if the Projection Postulate is true.  Again the ‘as if’ describes the Appearances, that is, 
the value states (which include the measurement outcomes) but not the quantum state. 
  Why do I say that this is like 'windowing' rather than like one-point perspective?  
On the CVMI every object, including every part of an object, ‘looks’ as if it has just been 
projected into some pure state.  This implies that we cannot say: it is just as if the 
‘collapse’ idea is right and the world looks as if it has just been subjected to great single 
comprehensive measurement.  For if a compound system is already in a pure state then its 
Appearance matches its Reality.  But in general there is no projection of that state of the 
whole which also sends the components into pure states.   Yet the value states are such 
that it is possible e.g. for both the whole and the parts to be definite in their Apparent 
characteristics (to the extent that compatibility of observables allows).  So it is as if each 
is seen individually from some measuring vantage point.   
 
The Final Challenge 
 The details of quantum theory interpretation are fascinating, challenging, and 
                                                 
15 See my review of Bub, Foundations of Physics 28 (1998), for an explanation of how the 
Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation is related to, but does not fall in, the class 
described in his book.  
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frustrating, and its problems are by no means all settled.  But my main aim in this paper is 
not to defend a specific interpretation -- let alone its details in one form or another! 
Rather, what I mean to do is to argue the thesis that this actual part of recent history of 
science should convince us that it is perfectly scientific, and scientifically acceptable, to 
reject the completeness criteria for science that I outlined.  Although I take it that all of 
the foregoing could have been granted by today's scientific realist if by anyone, that 
thesis concerning the aim and methodology of science appears to clash with at least 
certain traditional themes in 'realist' philosophies of science. 
  If my view of it is right, and if in addition the Copenhagen physicists were acting 
in a way that counts as real physics when they introduced and developed quite explicitly 
a theory and an interpretation incompatible with the Appearance from Reality 
completeness criterion, then that criterion is not a constraint on the sciences.  It is, in that 
case, just another of those philosophically or metaphysically motivated imperatives that 
could hamper science if they were obeyed, though they receive much lip service,  but are 
anyway quickly flouted  when that hampering is felt.  
  
